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The muddy waters of financialisation and new accumulation strategies in the global water 
industry: The case of AGBAR 
 
Abstract  
Since the turn of the century the global water industry has seen an influx of new financial actors, 
investment vehicles and markets along with a discernible change in the corporate strategies of big 
water operators. In this paper we argue that ‘financialisation’ is materially shaping ownership, 
control and geographical organisation in the global water industry. To make this case the paper 
investigates the historical development, geographical organisation and accumulation strategies of 
Aguas de Barcelona (AGBAR). By tracing out the development of AGBAR’s operations in Argentina, 
Chile and the United Kingdom the paper provides a window on to the complex links between the 
industrial activity of providing water, both in developing and developed markets, and the chain of 
actors, techniques and activities that have deepened the industry’s links with the circulation of 
finance capital. The paper argues that financialisation has been of an uneven and spatially variegated 
intensity, taking hold where the network of services and infrastructures involved in its delivery can 
be most profitably embroiled within new investment vehicles. This in turn has reacted back upon the 
geographical and strategic accumulation strategies of traditional water companies that are shifting 
from ownership operation to management contracts and research based investment.   
 
Keywords: financialisation, water sector, AGBAR, institutional investors, pension funds. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the global water industry has attracted the attention of many scholars that have 
investigated, inter alia, processes of privatisation, commodification, the dynamics of the ‘hydro-
social’ cycle, and the role social struggles and resistance over water governance (see for instance 
Bakker 2010; Bond 2010; Castro 2007; Harris et al. 2013; Domènech et al. 2013). However, the 
proliferation and impact of new financial markets, investment techniques, and actors in the water 
cycle has been somewhat under researched. In a special issue of Water Alternatives, dealing with so-
called ‘water grabbing’, Mehta et al. (2012) acknowledged that the financialisation of water services 
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and of the resource itself is a ‘somewhat unchartered territory’. Of course ‘financialisation’, given its 
proliferation in the academic literature, can function as somewhat of a nebulous concept. Yet it is 
this uncertainty around the concept, and within the sector itself, that we believe warrants a closer 
look at what ‘financialisation’ in the water sector may entail.  
Unlike oil and other natural resources such as carbon, water has not been ‘financialised’ in the sense 
of being traded on various platforms through spot prices, futures markets, and derivatives (see 
Labban 2010). Commentators and analysts point towards this possibility, but it is not yet a reality.1 
Rather what have been integrated into new investment vehicles are water infrastructures, services 
and ultimately the revenue streams generated by households. The wave of privatisation in the 1990s 
opened up the provision of water to new sources of private ownership, operation and investment 
which since around the turn of the century has attracted a broader array investors and new forms of 
financial engineering (Inderst 2009). This has been of an uneven and spatially variegated intensity. In 
short, it is not water itself, but the network of services and infrastructures involved in its delivery, 
that has been embroiled within the contemporary financial environment. 
This paper sets out to explore how ‘financialisation’ is shaping ownership, control and geographical 
organisation in the global water industry. To do so, we investigate the historical development, 
financial investment strategies and corporate restructuring of Aguas de Barcelona (henceforth 
AGBAR). AGBAR is one of the world’s biggest water operators currently controlled by French utility 
giant Suez Environnement. Whilst we do not want to suggest that AGBAR should be taken as the 
‘critical case’, representative of changes for the water industry at large, we will show that its 
financial history, scale and scope of operation provide a useful indication of changes that are at the 
cutting-edge of financialisation in the global water industry. Indeed, by tracing out key areas of 
AGBAR’s global operation we will be able to shed light on how the impact of changes in the global 
economy and the entry of investment, pension and infrastructure funds have had a material and 
geographical effect in the water sector. Thus, our aim is to provide a detailed empirical case study of 
important changes undergone by AGBAR and use this as a platform from which to reflect upon how 
 
1 As stated recently by chief economist of Citigroup, “I expect to see a globally integrated market for fresh 
water within 25 to 30 years. Once the spot markets for water are integrated, futures markets and other 
derivative water-based financial instruments…will follow. There will be different grades and types of fresh 
water, just the way we have light sweet and heavy sour crude oil today. Water as an asset class will, in my 
view, become eventually the single most important physical-commodity based asset class, dwarfing oil, 
copper, agricultural commodities and precious metals” (Business Insider 2011: online; FT Alphaville 2011: 
online). 
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far the case is representative of, challenges, or perhaps, extends our understanding of 
financialisation in the water industry. We do so through reference to the theoretical premises of 
financialisation in general and processes of financialisation in the water industry in particular. The 
former provides a macro framework and context for on-going changes in the global economy and 
the latter provides insights into specific transformations within the water industry.  
The paper argues that through its global operations AGBAR has encountered obstacles and 
opportunities as financialisation has deepened within the water sector, which, in turn, has 
influenced its accumulation strategies and seen it embark upon a geographical reorganisation and 
strategic consolidation within the sector. This we argue represents a specific, but ‘muddy’, case of 
‘financialisation’. By describing this as ‘muddy’, we have two intertwined processes in mind: first, 
instability in the global economy, itself linked to processes borne out by financial liberalisation and 
deregulation (currency swings and devaluation, capital over-accumulation, capital flight and political 
instability) which gave rise to a profitability crisis in, and retrenchment from, certain markets; 
second, the entry into the global water industry of new financial actors and the creation of new 
financial markets therein, created the material conditions through which AGBAR was able to re-
direct its accumulation strategy from ownership-based operation and into knowledge intensive 
research and the provision of water services. It is by investigating the interaction between these two 
processes that we can develop an understanding of how ‘financialisation’ is shaping ownership, 
control and geographical organisation in the global water industry.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two covers the general theoretical premises of the 
financialisation literature and then moves to unpack the concept and its implications of as seen 
through changes in the global water industry. In section three we develop a detailed qualitative case 
study of the changes AGBAR has undergone during its evolution as a global water company by 
means of focusing on three specific geographies: Argentina, Chile and United Kingdom. In section 
four we reflect theoretically upon how AGBAR’s accumulation strategy has been influenced by 
financialisation and how far the case-study is representative of financialisation and the water 
industry. We finish with a summary of our findings and argument and suggest some future lines of 
research.  
 
2. Mobilising ‘financialisation’ to understand changes in the global water industry   
One of the novelties of post 1970s capitalism has been the apparent rise to dominance of financial 
markets in the global economy. During this time the growth in the magnitude of financial assets has 
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outstripped the growth of global GDP. For instance, David Harvey (2010: 30) has pointed out that in 
global terms “the US$40 trillion annual turnover in 2001 compares to the estimated US$800 billion 
that would be required to support international trade and productive investment flows”, illustrating 
the apparent disunity between global finance capital relative to industrial production. A significant 
amount of research, across the social science disciplines, has been devoted to investigating the roots 
of this phenomena, prior to but especially post the 2008 financial crisis. The implications of this 
process are still much disputed (French et al 2011), and the literature that coalesces around the 
concept of ‘financialisation’ is extremely wide ranging. For instance, to recount just some of the 
most well-known accounts, financialisation has been mobilised to refer to the new locus of profits 
within capitalism (Crotty 2005; Dumenil and Levy 2005; Foster 2007); a class based project to restore 
the conditions of capital accumulation (Harvey 2005); the growing usage of financial concepts and 
cultures in daily life (Martin 2002); the dominance of the financial industry in the economy at large, 
measured by the share of finance-related income in non-financial firms (Krippner 2005); the creation 
of a new class of asset owning rentiers (Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Zeller 2009); and the ascendency 
of shareholder power in the influence of corporate business strategies (Froud et al 2007; Peters 
2011; Stockhammer 2008).  
This proliferation obviously poses the risk of appealing to an empty abstraction – the fate arguably of 
concepts such as ‘globalisation’ and ‘neoliberalism’ (Engelen 2008) – that has been invoked in so 
many scenarios as to lose explanatory power (for the full range categories see Lee et al 2009).2 With 
this danger in mind, we want to recognise that there is a universal element to financialisation that 
can provide insights into the macro-economic context, but then proceed analytically through appeal 
to the activities and income sources that are associated with the micro-economic processes in the 
water industry. At its most general level we would concur with Swyngedouw (2010: 308-309) that 
financialisation is a process linked to “a particular form of circulating capital, premised upon 
transforming geographically specific, relatively fixed, and particular conditions into abstract 
circulating and interest yielding capital”. At this level of abstraction the concept of financialisation 
has extensive applicability, but arguably could also contain within it processes such as 
commodification and neoliberalisation. Indeed, Fine argues (2010: 108) that financialisation can be 
seen as integral to (even shorthand for) neoliberalism and not merely one of its consequences. Thus 
 
2 In comparison to the logical properties of sociological concepts such as modernisation and secularisation 
Engelen has argued that financialisation “contains an epochal perspective on social reality with teleological 
overtones and a suggestion of gradual spatial extension. To shed these properties, the financialization 
literature has to become more sensitive to contextual variables and the way these interact with the wider 
capitalist developments that the concept of financialization is purported to denote” (Engelen 2008: 114). 
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to distinguish further what we mean by ‘financialisation’ in an empirical sense two interlinked 
processes are relevant  the activities that financial institutions pursue which include financial 
intermediation, financial advisory, and financial investment and the financial income sources that 
can derive from such activities which include such things as interest and dividends (Christophers 
2013). 
It is well known that institutional investors from the Anglo-American world, especially pension funds 
have tended to dominate flows of global finance (Clark 2001; 2005). The move by pension funds and 
other institutional investors away from equities and into fixed assets (property and infrastructure) in 
conditions of natural monopoly, especially following the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2001, 
could be taken as a further example of what Mitchell terms “the easier and more secure profits of 
rent” over “the difficult profits of productive activities or competitive trade” (2004: 22). This refers 
to the steady of stream of revenue that owners of financial assets can lay claim to over many years. 
This appropriation of revenue takes the form of interest-bearing capital (Fine 2010), and, therefore, 
reduces the difference between investments in stocks, shares, government debt and land to the 
extent that all assets are bought and sold according to the returns they yield (Harvey 1982). This 
according to Harvey (1982: 347) can be understood as the circulation of ‘fictitious capital’, a concept 
used to mobilise the way in which the trading of financial assets is based on “a claim upon future 
revenues they can yield, which means a claim upon future profits”. This emphasises the inherently 
speculative underbelly of financialisation which prices things in the present based upon projected 
future returns.       
In a recent article and monograph, Christophers (2012; 2013) suggests that this ability of financial 
institutions to profit from a range of global activities is indicative, above all, of a ‘shift in 
contemporary capitalism’s geography’, rather than its structural make-up. In a similar geographically 
minded study Clark and Wójcik (2007) have shown how global financial markets can provide the 
means for firms to defect from, or at least reorganise their relationship with, local institutional 
environments. And by “understanding the agency of firms and the incentives they face, particularly 
those offered by financial markets”, Dixon (2010: 11) argues we can provide direction and reason to 
macro-processes. Moreover, by unpacking the specificities of ‘natural’ conditions within a certain 
industry or sector, along with the specific institutional and operational conditions that companies 
confront, we can descend from the concerns of macroeconomic processes (i.e. the unresolved 
debate around where the locus of profits in the contemporary global economy are to be found) to 
provide a theoretically informed but empirically grounded account of financialisation (see also Kaika 
and Ruggiero 2013).  
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Therefore, in reference to the water sector we will identify the associated activities and income 
sources that are involved in transforming ‘things’ (infrastructures and services) into financial assets. 
But keeping in mind the above outlined limitations and boundaries of the concept of financialisation; 
the following offers some suggestions of how private participation in the water industry, since the 
late 1980s, has undergone a spatially variegated transition from privatisation to financialisation. 
2.1 From privatisation to financialisation: transformations in the water industry 
By the time ‘neoliberalism’ was in full swing globally the privatisation of former public companies 
and the deregulation of everything from labour and financial markets to the welfare state had 
become commonplace across many parts of the world. This retrenchment of the state also initiated 
a move back to the private provision of water in certain parts of the world (Budds and McGranahan 
2003). In the western world many state owned water companies were plagued by under-investment 
in fixed capital, a condition exacerbated by high levels of debt, fiscal deficits and the turn to austerity 
as a recovery strategy. Recurrent scarcity periods and ageing infrastructure, combined with new 
stringent environmental regulations led to demands for increased investment (March and Saurí 
2013). In this way water privatization also became embroiled in a wider debate over the sphere of 
legitimacy of the state and the most efficient way to organise the allocation of investment and 
resources – with ideological, material and political support, often backed by multilateral lending 
institutions, falling on the side of the market (Bakker 2003). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) promoted by international organizations in developing and 
transition economies, and full privatization processes such as the ones in England and Wales (Bakker 
2005) and in Chile (Bauer 2004; Budds 2004), provided new markets for the pre-established 
European water firms beyond their domestic markets (Marin 2009). By the early 1990s European 
firms such as Suez, Veolia, Thames Water, Saur and AGBAR had considerable economic momentum 
based upon a sustained period of capital accumulation in the late 20th century and previous 
experience of public-private partnerships. As a result these traditional companies were well placed 
to compete in the newly expanding private water supply market.3 At the global level, from 1991 to 
2001 the population served by new awards to private operators increased from 6 million to 93 
 
3 Western Europe is by in large the area where private participation is strongest due to its long history in water 
supply. Suez (formerly Ondeo and Lyonnaise des Eaux) and Veolia (previously part of Vivendi, and also known 
as Compagnie Generale des Eaux) are the biggest European water companies. France is the only country in the 
world (with the exception of some cases such Barcelona or Valencia in Spain) where private companies 
emerging during the 19th century were not municipalized as it happened elsewhere in Europe and the United 
States. 
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million people (Marin 2009). From 1991-1997 the ‘big five’ mentioned above represented some 90% 
of the total investment commitment for the period 1991-1997, often embarking upon joint ventures 
to divide new markets; as a result investments in and operation of the water sector assumed an 
oligopolistic form (Marin et al. 2010; Morgan 2006; Swyngedouw 2005).  
However, previous rounds of restructuring in the global economy, particularly the breakdown of the 
fixed exchange rate system in 1973, the global rise of interest rates in 1979 (Volcker shock), and the 
so called ‘big bang’ in 1986 that saw the interlinking of global stock and financial markets (Harvey 
2010: 18), meant that whilst barriers to the movement of capital diminished and a range of new 
markets opened up, volatility and speculation increased. The financial crises that engulfed Asia in 
1997 spread to Russia in 1998 and Argentina by 2001, notwithstanding specificities of regional 
accumulation models, were symptomatic of the instabilities internal to the logic of financial 
liberalisation: the opening up of capital accounts, huge credit creation and capital inflows, increasing 
private sector debt, bouts of speculation, and ultimately devaluation and currency turbulence. One 
of the many upshots of this volatility was the impact upon the operational and financial terms of PPP 
prevalent in many developing countries that were particularly vulnerable to disruptions in capital 
markets and exchange rates. A central problem became one of currency mismatch between revenue 
and financing sources: if debt denominated in dollars is recovered from payments made in a newly 
devalued currency, the original financial arrangement is thrown out of sync. Moreover, losses 
incurred through devaluation could not be offset, in most cases, by tariff increases which in times of 
crisis were socially and politically unfeasible (Baietti and Raymond 2005). Added to this were 
vulnerabilities specific to the ‘natural’ characteristics of the water sector such as its capital intensity 
and monopoly character that raises the investment risks associated with privatisations, as large 
amounts of debt are often concentrated among only a few companies, who in turn are beholden to 
shareholders and their demands to avoid low or risky returns.   
It is out of this context that a second wave of private activity in the water cycle emerged. As Hall 
(2006: 182; see also OECD 2010: 39) has documented: from the early 2000s corporate strategies in 
the water sector have focused upon reducing exposure to developing or non-performing countries 
whilst at the same time reducing accumulated debts; as a way to stay active on world markets but 
avoid risks associated with direct capital investment water companies have moved into management 
contracts and research based investment; and, especially since 2002, assets such as infrastructure 
have been sold to financial investors. This in turn speaks to specific ‘skill-set’ that financial actors 
bring to the sector by distributing risk through techniques such as securitisation, in which revenues 
streams are packaged into tradable financial products (derivatives), broken up into earning 
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packages, assigned a risk profile and sold onto investors seeking long-term returns (Allen and Pryke 
2013; O’Neill 2009). As we will argue in empirical detail below, it has been on the back of such 
financialisation techniques and the entry of new financial actors into the sector that traditional 
companies have re-organised their own accumulation strategies within the sector.   
Therefore, since the outset of the 21st century, we believe it is possible to identify a dual process 
whereby traditional transnational water companies are playing a smaller role (in terms of market 
share/ownership) at the global level, whilst, at the same time, new financial markets for water-
related assets have increased. As a result the private water sector as a whole and companies within 
it are further subject to external scrutiny from financial analysts and investors (such as pension 
funds), along with new specialist performance indexes and managed funds which attract a variety of 
investors (see also Gialis et al. 2011). One of the largest set of indexes that serve to quantify and 
measure the performance of the global water industry is provided by the S-Network Global Water 
Indexes (formerly known as Janney Global Water Index). According to this index, from 2005 to 2010 
investment in the water sector returned an annual average of 10.21% (Peers et al. 2010: 6).4 But 
given that indexes are imaginary portfolios of securities representing a particular market or a portion 
of it they are used to construct exchange traded funds (ETF) whose portfolios mirror the 
performance of the index.5 These vehicles give investors exposure to the leading global companies in 
everything from water utilities, water treatment companies, and retail and distribution companies 
that operate in a global water market estimated to worth around US$360 billion (Coy and LaCorte 
2013).  
Thus in the context of the continued fallout from the global financial crisis in 2008, and uncertainly 
towards the value of equities and other large asset classes such as government bonds, investors 
have been attracted to water as it provides predictable inflation-linked cash flows under 
monopolistic terms (with low demand elasticity) which has tended to match the long-term liabilities 
of certain financial actors (Bloomberg 2007; FT 2011a; 2011b). It is perhaps in this context that 
institutional investors, looking for other viable investment opportunities, have contributed towards 
 
4 Other water indexes include the Palisades Water Index which tracks the performance of global water 
companies including water utilities and various equipment manufacturers; the Dow Jones U.S. Water Index 
made up of 29 stocks of international and national companies that have a minimum market capitalisation of 
US$150 million; and the ISE Water Index, which, launched in 2006, comprises over 35 stocks linked to water 
distribution, water filtration and flow technology. 
5 For instance the PowerShares Water Resource ETF and the PowerShares Global Water Portfolio both track 
the Palisades index and the best performing ETF of late has been the First Trust ISE Water (FIW) which tracks 
the ISE Water Index.  
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“a widespread interest and excitement regarding water-related businesses” (Maxwell 2012: 17). But 
if this all suggests the financialised ownership of assets in the water industry can provide attractive 
returns, what does the reorganisation of accumulation strategies (away from ownership and direct 
capital investment) undertaken by large traditional companies suggest about our empirical and 
theoretical understandings of financialisation in the water industry? To this question we now turn by 
focusing on the contemporary trajectory of AGBAR.   
 
3. The internationalisation of water supply and finance: the case of AGBAR 
The origins of AGBAR can be traced back to Compañía de Aguas de Barcelona that was actually 
formed in Liège in 1867 with Belgian (Crédit Général Liégeois) and French (Compagnie Générale des 
Conduites d’Eau) capital (Voltes Bou 1967). In the 1920s the company was overtaken by Spanish 
bankers, and with the exception of the brief collectivization during the Spanish civil war (Gorostiza et 
al. 2013; March 2013), it remained in the hands of banking groups throughout late 20th century. 
Water supply in Barcelona, as well as that of many French cities, was never municipalized as 
happened elsewhere in Europe or the United States (Hall and Lobina 2007; Melosi 2011; Morgan 
2004). Given the natural monopoly of water supply this permitted a sustained period of capital 
accumulation for large private firms during the 20th century. From the 1960s onwards the group 
expanded its business mainly in Catalonia and Mediterranean Spain (March Corbella 2010). By the 
end of the Franco dictatorship in the late 1970s AGBAR was an important part of the Barcelona Stock 
Exchange and the company looked to begin its incipient international geographic expansion (Ibid.). 
With the incorporation of Spain into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, new 
business opportunities opened up. First, Portugal was a target for internationalization with the 
creation of Lusagua in 1987. At the same time the company sought to diversify its accumulation 
strategies which included forays into areas such as waste treatment and health insurance (through 
Adeslas) – the latter being an indication of the way in which large companies were seeking to 
activate their capital in sectors that were newly opening up to private investment. According to CEO 
Ricard Fornesa the strategy was to diversify into companies with a strong prospect of generating 
future returns (LV, 29/10/1985:36).  
If the 1980s saw the emergence of an international accumulation strategy, by the 1990s AGBAR 
became one of the most important water companies across the globe. During this period the group 
underwent several major changes in the shareholder structure, with equity changing hands between 
banks and utility companies via mergers and takeovers. The standout change came in 1990 when the 
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Catalan bank La Caixa became the second major shareholder, just behind the utility company 
Lyonnaise des Eaux (currently Suez).6 In 1992 AGBAR was considered “a potent group without debts 
and secure profitability’” (LV, 27/3/1992:45), standing amongst the 10 largest private companies in 
the stock exchange of Madrid (LV, 21/6/1992:87).7 By the mid-1990s AGBAR was controlled by banks 
(La Caixa and Banco Bilbao-Vizcaya), energy utilities (Endesa and Iberdrola) and by a multi-utility 
company (Lyonnaise des Eaux) while the remainder shares traded freely in the Spanish stock 
exchange. During this period, non-core activities – those not directly related to the water cycle – 
represented more than the half of the company’s revenue stream, with its health care company 
Adeslas yielding almost a quarter of total revenues (LV, 18/5/1994:64). 
At the end of the 20th century as the CEO of the company noted ‘the problem [was] not the money 
[…] but finding good opportunities’ (LV, 10/11/1999:90). One opportunity that did present itself 
around this time was expansion into Argentina, an experience that would go on to shape a large part 
of AGBAR’s accumulation strategies and financial repositioning vis-à-vis the water industry. Drawing 
upon newspaper library research, water business reports, institutional reports as well as secondary 
research, in what follows we present three cases in the recent trajectory of AGBAR in which 
‘financialisation’ has impacted the geographical and strategic reorganisation of the company. First, 
the case of Argentina which goes back to the 1990s serves to illustrate retrenchment from 
developing markets in the context of the financial crisis, currency risks and falling profitability. 
Second, we look at the Chilean and UK water markets where, on the back of strong performance, 
new financial actors became increasingly interested in the ownership of traditional water 
infrastructures and utilities as financial assets. In this context we show how AGBAR is shifting from 
its original base of accumulation (urban water distribution) into knowledge intensive services and 
products within the water sector. This trajectory of AGBAR serves to highlight how macro-economic 
financial instability and the processes and techniques associated with financialisation in the water 
industry have been central to the reconfiguration of the geographies and modalities of their private 
participation in the water cycle. Given that AGBAR represents a single case within a large and 
complex global sector, methodologically we seek to use the empirical findings as the basis for 
theoretical generalisation in line with the arguments discussed in section 2.  
 
6 In 1997 Lyonnaise des Eaux merged with the Compagnie Financière de Suez, creating Suez Lyonnaise des 
Eaux. Subsequently in 2002 Environmental operations (water management, waste management, and energy) 
were grouped into a single business line: the Suez Environnement Group was born. 




3.1. Argentina: Financial crisis and corporate restructuring  
The slow speed of growth of Spain’s highly regulated water in the 1990s contributed to AGBAR’s 
internationalisation as the company sought out new water markets overseas, setting up its primary 
expansion plan in Argentina. Argentina was one of the Latin American countries enthusiastically 
following the ‘Washington Consensus’ during the 1990s, privatising state owned assets, opening its 
capital account and liberalising financial and labour markets. In 1993, Aguas Argentinas, a 
consortium that included AGBAR as a 25% stakeholder among other major private water operators,8 
won the 30-year concession for Buenos Aires by offering the largest tariff reduction among the 
bidders (see Alcázar et al. 2000; Hall 1999; Olleta 2007).9 The concession was awarded based upon 
proposals for the expansion of the network, a reduction in price to end-users and environmental 
improvements such as new waste management capacity; commitments that required significant 
infrastructural investment. At the time such commitments did not present an issue for AGBAR and 
its partners because the Buenos Aires water market was estimated to be “the most profitable water 
concession in the world, with rates of returns approaching 40 per cent” (Loftus and McDonald 2001: 
191). Indeed, in a broader macroeconomic context, according to Alcázar et al. (2000: 32) “an 
important factor enhancing the credibility of the government’s commitment to the concession was 
the concern of the Argentine government with its reputation in global financial markets”. 
However by 2002, only 9 years into a 30 year commitment, Aguas Argentinas became so 
unprofitable that Suez and AGBAR requested its termination and threatened to abandon the 
concession (LV, 20/1/2005:69). The financial and operational commitments of the original 
concession were thrown drastically out sync during the financial crisis that engulfed Argentina at the 
turn of the century. Some respite was initially provided by the World Bank and its financial arm the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) when in 2004 Aguas Argentinas was granted a financial 
restructuring program reducing its debt by 35% (Olleta 2007:12). However, Aguas Argentinas 
continued to be embroiled in operational disputes largely concerning a refusal to fulfil infrastructural 
investment agreements without further tariff increases.  
 
8 Lyonnaise des Eaux, Vivendi, Anglian Water; it also included the Spanish bank Banco de Galicia. 
9 Latter, in 1995 Aguas de Santa Fe, a company owned partially by Aguas de Barcelona, won a 30-year 
concession to supply water and provide wastewater services to fifteen districts in the Argentinean province of 
Santa Fe.  
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The Argentina experience has been described by Juan Antonio Guijarro, AGBAR’s country manager 
for the Americas, as “a misunderstanding between the parties, over errors in calculation of the 
clients’ capacity to pay, and through overestimating the ability to finance the infrastructure gaps via 
tariffs” (GWI 2010: online). Such ‘errors’ in financial engineering and decision making, however, 
cannot be explained alone by AGBAR’s strategy in Argentina, however flawed and reliant upon tariff 
increases as it was (see Loftus and McDonald 2001). Through the latter part of the 1990s Argentina 
became reliant upon the expansion of government debt to maintain its convertibility plan that tied 
the peso to the US dollar (Carrera 2006). However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 which saw the 
reversal of short term capital flows into developing markets sparked a chain reaction of regional 
financial turmoil, hitting Latin America with a run on the Brazilian currency which tipped regional 
markets into recession (Grinberg 2013). By 2001 the Argentinean state found it could no longer 
increase its foreign debt on international markets. When its capacity to replenish currency reserves 
evaporated the government introduced the corralito in an attempt to avoid a run on the banking 
system. Crisis conditions overwhelmed the Argentine economy as credit disappeared, tax collection 
plummeted, bankruptcies became widespread and unemployment rocketed (Carrera 2006). The 
peso was devalued in response to the crisis, this eroded AGBAR’s profits at the same time as 
inflation massively increased its debts which were denominated in dollars (Olleta 2007). Mounting 
financial disputes such as the demand from Aguas Argentinas for exchange rate insurance which 
would stipulate that in the event of future devaluation the state would bear more than half of the 
company’s external debt, set the stage for the terms of the concession to become untenable for all 
parties.  
The decision to end their operations in Buenos Aires was finally taken by AGBAR together with Suez 
and other partners in September 2005 (while the Argentinean government claimed they were the 
ones to rescind the concession (LV, 22/3/2006:57)). Since which time financial disputes have 
intensified, with both sides having initiated legal proceedings to recover losses that stretch into the 
hundreds of millions (GWI 2010). One clear upshot for AGBAR has been a growth in caution from a 
financial management perspective, as Guijarro also affirmed: “though we’re prepared to make 
investments, it is a mistake to be perceived just as financiers filling the historic infrastructure gap in 
developing countries” (GWI 2010). The extent to which private water firms have actually played this 
(quasi-benevolent) role is questionable and beyond the scope of this paper, what concerns our 
argument is how this perception has fed into changes in the geography and accumulation strategy of 
AGBAR – a line of analysis that we take up further in section 4 below. 
3.2. The Chilean water market and new financial actors 
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Although widely regarded as the test case for neoliberal privatisation (Taylor 2002), it was not until 
1998 that Chile embarked on large scale water privatisation. This turning point marked the large 
scale transfer of the assets previously held by state limited companies to the private sector (SISS 
2013). By 2004 all public water companies had been partially sold off (the majority of the shares) or 
leased for 30 years to the private sector, following the French concession model (Ibid.). The state 
retained a stake in most of the companies, but by far the biggest players were the traditional 
transnational water companies such as AGBAR (and Suez) along with British companies such as 
Thames Water and Anglian Water (see Larraín and Poo 2010). 
One of the major players in this wave of privatizations was a new consortium Inversiones Aguas 
Metropolitanas Limitada (IAM) led by AGBAR and Lyonnaise (later Suez). Formed in 1999, IAM 
bought 51.2% of the most important public water supplier in Chile: Empresa Metropolitana de Obras 
Sanitarias (EMOS), which became known as Aguas Andinas. The takeover included an indefinite 
concession for the water supply service for Santiago de Chile, with a population of 5 million people 
(LV, 12/6/1999). A year later AGBAR increased its presence in the Chilean water supply market with 
the acquisition, through Aguas Andinas, of Aguas Cordillera, the supplier of the wealthy districts of 
Santiago de Chile along with a 50 percent stake in the Chilean water firm Aguas Manquehue (LV, 
2/2/2002). In 2002 and again in 2004, AGBAR expanded its control over the Chilean company by 
means of an internal reorganisation of IAM’s share structure which saw Suez reduce its exposure in 
Chile (GWI 2004). Thus, after leaving the main concession in Argentina in 2005 and scaling back its 
operations in Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba, Chile became AGBAR’s main site of 
expansion providing by far the highest regional returns and subsequently the opportunity to take 
advantage of deeper financialisation of the market. The following offers an empirical illustration of 
the transition, outlined above, from privatisation to financialisation as the Chilean water sector 
became linked with new financial markets and began to attract the interest of new financial actors in 
the shape of pension, investment funds and banks.  
In 2005 IAM, as the majority shareholder of Aguas Andinas, floated 49.9% of its shares on the 
Chilean stock market and also in the US through American depositary shares (ADS), the latter vehicle 
providing foreign corporations indirect exposure to US stock markets. This strategy aimed to 
increase Aguas Andinas liquidity, that is reap cash returns, on the back of “Aguas Andinas’ good 
performance, the solid macroeconomic conditions of Chile and the stability of the sector’s regulatory 
framework (BNAmericas 2005: online). Through these financialisation mechanisms AGBAR was able 
to initiate the expansion of Aguas Andinas both in the Chilean market and abroad. In 2008, Aguas 
Andinas obtained a 51% stake in the Chilean water company ESSAL, formerly held by the Spanish 
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energy company Iberdrola (SISS 2013). Then in 2009 Aguas Andinas expanded its business beyond 
the regulated water supply and sanitation services in Chile, leading to further expansion beyond 
Chilean frontiers (by means of Chile-based companies). Full financialisation of Aguas Andinas can be 
said to have taken place in 2011, when the Chilean state sold its remaining 30% in the company for 
980 million dollars to a range of new stakeholders (GWI 2011a; SISS 2013). Combined with a 
previous floating of 15% its shares (GWI 2011a), this left the state with only a 5% stake through the 
Public Development Corporation CORFO (SISS 2013).  
Therefore, whilst IAM continues to be (in 2013) the majority (50.1%) shareholder of Aguas Andinas, 
the packaging of the company into discrete financial holdings has seen new financial actors enter the 
picture, such as the Chilean Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP) with a direct 2.2% 
holding and a further 7.2% issued by stockbrokers as financial intermediaries for public equity 
markets (Aguas Andinas 2013). And as an example of portfolio diversification within this financial 
structure, other parties have an indirect (dividends as opposed to operating profits) exposure to 
Aguas Andinas through holdings in IAM where AGBAR through the subsidiary IAGSA is the main 
shareholder. For example the Banco de Chile has a 7.79% holding on behalf of third parties, the Bank 
of New York (BoNY) 1.74% on behalf the holders of American Depositary Shares, while the Chilean 
pension fund AFP has a 1.23% holding (see IAM, 2013).  
For pension and investment funds the stability of the Chilean water market (lower risk of exchange 
rate fluctuations and civil unrest) and a period of proven profitability, in contrast to the above 
Argentinean case, offer a ‘safe’ investment for large surpluses of capital. For instance the Ontario 
Teacher’s Pension Plan (OTTP), the largest single-profession plan in Canada managing the pension 
schemes of more than 300,000 retired and active teachers (OTTP 2013), entered the Chilean water 
market in 2007. According to their internal reports this was because, “Chile continues to be an 
excellent place to invest. As long-term investors, we are attracted by the ability of these two 
companies [ESVAL and ESSVIO] to generate predictable returns over many years to help meet the 
plan’s pension obligations” (OTPP 2011: online). And as an indication of the broader applicability of 
AGBAR’s trajectory in Chile, the OTTP has also moved into ownership structures through the 
purchase of assets from other traditional transnational companies such as Thames Water and 
Anglian Water.10 
 
10 Specifically they became the main shareholder of ESVAL acquiring 69.4% of their shares (ESVAL 2009; OTPP 
2007), from Consorcio Financiero, the major insurance company in Chile, and other shareholders. Previously in 
2004 Consorcio became the major shareholder the company at the expense of Anglian Water.  On the other 
hand, OTPP also became the major shareholder of ESSBIO in the detriment of Southern Cross, which in turn 
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Therefore, in contrast to AGBAR’s reactive strategy in Argentina, it was precisely the strength of the 
market and the strong performance of privatisation that made the sector attractive to large financial 
actors. This presented the traditional companies with the chance to reap profits by liquidating 
ownership holdings, but also expand and reorganise within the Chilean market through 
management and operation contracts. This case is indicative of how the growing financialisation of 
developed water markets is reacting upon the geographies of ownership and operation, a trend that 
is also evident in the UK water market and AGBAR’s recent financial repositioning therein.    
3.3 The UK water market and financialisation strategies 
Alongside Chile, the English and Welsh water services market has been the other main outlet for 
AGBAR’s international operation over the last decade. Against the backdrop of deregulation under 
the Thatcher government, water supply in England and Wales underwent a process privatisation 
through the formation of private regional water utilities in 1989 (Bakker 2005). The first round of 
buyouts initially saw ‘English’ capital take controlling stakes in the newly privatised water market. 
However, in the period 2000-2010 there was a sea change in shareholder structure with 18 out of 27 
companies recording changes of ownership (Office of Fair Trading 2010). This we suggest is also 
illustrative of the privatisation-financialisation dynamic outlined above, which saw many 
international water companies (Suez, Veolia, RWE and AGBAR) take up strategic positions in the 
English water market then relinquish holdings to new financial investors. For example, AGBAR 
entered the British water market with the take-over of Bristol Water in 2006. AGBAR paid 10.60 
pounds-a-share (plus a dividend of 22.5 pence per share), valuing the company at 170 million 
pounds, 40% higher than the average closing share price over the year before (The Guardian, 
22/04/2006). The deal, however, actually rose to 390 million pounds when the outstanding debt 
(160 million pounds) was factored in, making it the highest bid premium in the UK water market 
until that date (GWI 2006). Given that this deal was said to lack industrial rationale, the buyout 
seems to represent a defensive form of financial repositioning on behalf of AGBAR to avert a hostile 
takeover bid from Veolia (GWI 2006).  
 
had bought the stakes of Thames Water back in 2005 (GWI 2005; SISS 2013). In 2011, in the context of a 
further step backwards for the state, OTPP increased its stakes in ESSBIO to 89.6% and in ESVAL to 94.2% 
(OTPP 2011). Currently OTPP is the second “water provider” of Chile; however, if talk in terms of ownership, 
OTPP is the major owner of assets in the Chilean water market (SISS 2013), ahead of AGBAR.   
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Only five years after this acquisition, in October 2011, AGBAR sold its majority stake in Bristol Water 
to the Canadian global infrastructure fund Capstone, retaining a 30% holding and an agreement to 
provide advice and assistance with operational and technological services (FT 2011b). AGBAR 
(2011a) said that the entrance of a financial partner represented investors’ acknowledgment of the 
good management of the company. Thus in a similar vein to the Chilean market, the strong 
performance of private water companies attracted a new wave of financial investors which 
embroiled AGBAR within further processes of financialisation. Indeed, according to Capstone (2012), 
the attractiveness of UK water market lies in its stable regulatory environment which permits the 
recovery of operating costs and a reasonable return on capital invested. Yet by May 2012, just few 
months after this buyout, Capstone had already sold 20% of the company for US$68 million to the 
Japanese trading company Itochu Corporation (Itochu 2012). This deal was designed to provide just 
under half the funds to pay down the US$150 million loan it took to finance the original deal (Global 
Water Intelligence 2012b).  
Such a leveraged purchase, in any corporate sector, requires access to cheap capital or the quick 
turnover of assets to uphold equity values and reduce the risk of exposure to large tracts of debt. In 
the case of Capstone its “projected equity returns” were based upon a “combination of the leverage 
in the acquisition and the associated debt providing a lower cost of capital than 4.5%”, but the debt 
(issued and brokered by the Australian infrastructure and investment fund Macquarie) carried a rate 
of interest of 4.75% for the first 9 months, and rose to a maximum of 7.25% thereafter (GWI 2011b). 
Initially Capstone mooted the possibility of replacing the debt with bonds and internally generated 
cash, but ultimately turned to fresh equity release with the 20% sale to Itochu Corporation to fill this 
financial hole. By taking over AGBAR’s majority stake in Bristol water and treating it as a financial 
asset, through hands-off operation and debt-led takeover, Capstone’s actions shine a light on the 
above outlined (section 2.1) risks of financialisation in the water sector: when the asset’s yield drops 
below its price (cost + interest) it reveals fictitious capital for what it is - the speculative claim upon 
future profits. This also highlights the role of financial intermediaries, in this example Macquarie, 
using their ability to access AAA rated debt and expertise in infrastructure deals to act as market 
makers (Labban 2010), allowing assets to change hands more readily with the entry of other 
financial institutions interested in speculative or projected returns. 
AGBAR’s financial repositioning is symptomatic of recent activity in the English water market. 
Traditional operators that were the first movers in the privatisation drive have now offloaded large 
portions of their assets to infrastructure funds and investment consortiums. For instance, since the 
mid-2000s companies such as Thames Water, The Anglian Water Group and Southern Water have all 
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been acquired by a range of infrastructure funds and global investment consortiums.11 
Notwithstanding the specificities of each deal this offers an empirical illustration of how changes in 
shareholder structure in the UK water sector are being driven by the incentives, mechanisms and 
techniques of financialisation which permit leveraged take-overs, the compartmentalisation and 
pricing of assets, and the attraction of a range of new financial investors. Again, drawing principally 
on the case of AGBAR the following section, in reference to the theoretical discussion developed 
above (section 2), explores how this process of financialisation has reacted back upon the 
accumulation strategies, and therefore the geography of, traditional water companies.   
4. Variegated geographies of financialisation and new accumulation strategies  
The case study of AGBAR provides one window on to the variegated and complex links between the 
industrial activity of providing water, both in developing and developed markets, and the chain of 
actors, techniques and activities that have deepened the industry’s links with the circulation of 
finance capital. As was shown above the activities and income sources linked to financialisation can 
disperse risks and prices different assets for potential investors, thus creating new markets once 
removed from the ‘muddy’ waters of direct operation, but at the same time translating this into the 
‘muddy’ waters of financialisation. This perhaps points towards an intensification of Swyngedouw’s 
(2006: 199) claim that “the fundamental axis around which the water nexus is organized is the 
availability of and access to capital.” Thus it is not just access to capital, but through whom the 
capital is raised, under what financial terms and where it is to be invested. It is clear that for AGBAR, 
as a traditional transnational water company, its priorities lie in reducing exposure to sunk costs and 
the requirement to pursue infrastructural investment.   
The response to ‘shareholder value’ (Froud et al 2000) within the company’s corporate governance 
provides part of the micro explanation why AGBAR shifted away from large-scale infrastructural 
investment after its Argentina experience. Yet it was also the limits of Argentina’s development 
policy that pegged to the peso to the dollar and required the sustained influx of foreign credit that 
contributed AGBAR’s financial and industrial strategy becoming untenable. As Arrighi (1994: 320-
 
11 Thames Water was acquired by Kemble Water Holdings Limited, a company comprised of the global 
infrastructure fund Macquarie, pension funds and other large investors from Canada, Australia and Europe 
(Thames Water 2011). The Anglian Water Group Limited (AWG) was acquired the global investment 
consortium Osprey Acquisitions Limited made up of partners fro, Canada, UK and Australia (Anglian Water 
Group 2012). Southern Water was acquired by the American bank JP Morgan together with the Australia’s 
Challenger Infrastructure Fund in 2007 (Bloomberg 2007; NYT 2007). 
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321) outlined in one of the pioneering accounts of financialisation ‘fluctuations in exchange rates 
became a major factor in determining variations in corporate cash flow positions, sales, profits, and 
assets in different countries and currencies. In order to hedge against these variations, corporations 
had little choice but to resort to the further geopolitical diversification of their operations.’ However, 
given the geographically fixed form taken by investment in the water industry, AGBAR’s experience 
highlights an inability to hedge against financial risks when capital is sunk into water infrastructures. 
Thus rather than diversification across countries we encounter geographical consolidation within 
certain geographies of the water the sector.  When seen from this perspective it is clear that 
financialisation in the water sector is far from a smooth linear process. Rather changes to the 
economic environment provoke changes in financial calculation which is always an expression of 
variegated geographies and the uneven terrain upon which financialisation plays out (Pike and 
Pollard 2010). For instance, in general terms the withdrawal of the big operators from Latin America 
pointed to a decline in the number of contracts awarded annually to private operators (for instance 
in 2006 the figures were similar to those of pre 1999 (see Marin 2009)).  
It is out of this trend that we can decipher the accumulation strategies of AGBAR, the incentives 
offered by financial markets (Clark and Wójcik 2007; Dixon 2010), and its integration into new 
innovation schemes to capture added value less from traditional (material) ownership and more 
from (immaterial) knowledge. As part of Suez’s overall corporate strategy, AGBAR has shifted 
markedly away from long-term contracts and ownership of traditional urban infrastructures to new 
services and technological solutions (GWI 2012). Examples include Aquology, AGBAR’s global brand 
which includes integral technological solutions for the water cycle, knowledge intensive activities 
and innovation that are designed to adapt to the particularities and geography of the customer 
(AGBAR 2011b). Indeed, Aquology has been leading the way in smart meter technology and its 
solutions have “become a standard in the market” (Aquology 2013). Actually, at the time of writing, 
through its subsidiary Aquology AGBAR was planning to build a US$300 million desalination plant in 
the Atacama desert in Chile, where the activities of mining companies are raising water demand 
(Bloomberg, 16/10/2013). AGBAR has projected a growing role for desalination in Chile in the 
coming years (from 120,000 m3/day to 650,000 m3/day in 2016) linked to the operation of industrial 
and mining projects (BNAmericas, 18/10/2013). Other examples include Dolce Ô and Blue Orange. 
The former develops services at the household level, from tools to monitor water use and leakages 
to alert systems (Lyonnaise des Eaux 2013), and the latter, created in 2010, functions as an 
investment fund to promote new water and waste technologies (Suez Environnement 2013). These 
shifts towards quality-based activities may also hint at an awareness of the trend of decreasing 
water consumption in many cities, for instance in Europe (Saurí, 2013). Thus, the pattern that 
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emerges from this is new market niches based on services and technology have been flourishing at 
the same time as financialisation has taken hold of the ownership of urban water supply.   
Where these financialised forms of ownership in the water cycle have taken hold it suggests the 
evasion of the materiality in two key respects. First, traditional water companies have moved away 
from the risks associated with large sunk costs and endorsed the separation of ownership from 
management. A move made possible by the techniques of financialisation and the ceding of majority 
equity holdings to new institutional investors. Second, finance capital (pension funds, investment 
funds) and its forms of financial intermediation (leveraged buy outs, cheap debt) have increased the 
liquidity of water assets and ushered in a range of actors seeking a foothold in the water sector that 
are removed from the day to day operations and material provenance of their revenue streams. 
What is significant to note in this respect is that investors in new water based vehicles – mediated by 
financial institutions – are not concerned with investing directly in the utility company, as was the 
case with direct equity holdings in water companies as illustrated in the history of AGBAR. Rather, 
water focused investment funds attract investors by the fees, projected returns and policies of the 
fund managers which can often be treated separately from the actual finances of utilities 
themselves. As Hall (2009: 8) argues “it is an illusion to think that the returns on this investment 
come from the secure revenues of utilities.”  
In this light it is an empirically intractable problem to untangle whether returns to investors in water 
related vehicles derive from inventive forms of financial engineering such as arbitrage or from the 
profits linked to household revenue streams (see Allen and Pryke 2013). The former would suggest 
that financialisation has indeed taken place whereas the latter would point towards a direct link 
between industrial activity in the water cycle and returns to investors. What can be garnered from 
this trend, however, is that the embedding water infrastructures and services in global capital 
markets, as financial assets, has deepened the accumulation potential of private participation in the 
water cycle. Whether operating passively through index linked ETFs or based upon direct acquisition 
by institutional investors, it is not the asset itself that is sold on, but the performance of the asset 
(O’Neil 2009). As noted above, it is in this way that investment in both water utilities and 
infrastructures can function as a form of ‘fictitious capital’ (Harvey 1982), that are bought and sold 
according to the yield they can offer thereby transferring the risk onto the owners of a variety of 
dependent (or derivative) financial products’ (O’Neil 2009: 171). Allen and Pryke (2013) have 
outlined the ‘post-political’ implications of this change whereby a captive public are embroiled 
unwittingly in the world of financialisation, which exists beyond the purview of regulators and 
means that value can be transferred from ‘consumer’ to investor through the ‘muddy’ channels of 
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financialisation.  At the same time companies such as AGBAR are less and less tied financially to the 
fortunes of geographically fixed operating contracts and instead have the mobility of a global water-
tech service provider, which as we have shown has been part and parcel of the financialisation of 
water utilities and infrastructures and the separation of ownership from management.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
As Christophers (2012) has suggested the notion of a ‘financialised capitalism’ may be bending the 
stick too far; given how much the financialisation literature is skewed towards the experiences of 
‘national’ variants of capitalism found in the most putatively financialised economies of the UK and 
the US. In this paper we have adopted a sector specific, but transnational perspective, seen through 
the lens of AGBAR’s restructuring to offer some theoretically informed, but empirically grounded 
reflections upon financialisation in the water industry. The paper took care to de-limit the 
boundaries of the concept by sticking to the analysis of financial activities and income sources that 
have become bound up with the complex and decentralised operation of the water sector. 
From this basis we provided added reflections on what has been identified as a shift in the interests 
of big water operators from long-term and high-risk agreements (full-ownership or concession) to 
shorter and more managerial contracts (affermage, management contracts, etc.) and to new 
interventions in the water cycle, such as desalination (see Bakker 2010; 2013; Hall and Lobina 2012a; 
2012b; Marin 2009). The paper tied this transformation to the changes wrought by financialisation in 
the water sector, by making contextually specific theoretical generalisations from AGBAR’s 
geographical reorganisation and sector specific consolidation. The paper, however, does not imply 
that a simple cause and effect can be elucidated from the AGBAR case or from the dynamics of 
financialisation.  As our appeal the metaphorical notion of ‘muddy’ suggests understanding 
‘financialisation’ requires a dialectical combination of macro-economic context and micro-economic 
specificities.  
Thus AGBAR’s move to restructure their mode of operation and enhance profitability in the water 
sector was shown to be a response to pressures emanating from spatially variegated geographies of 
the global water industry where currency risks, profitability squeezes and political intervention in 
developing markets prompted direct operational retrenchment. Whereas profits reaped from equity 
liquidation in developed markets, have been invested in diversified technology led accumulation 
strategies. Thus what we can observe is that the forms of ‘financialisation’ investigated in this paper 
are representative of instability in developing markets and the conditions that prevail in developed 
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water markets where a sustained and ‘successful’ period of privatisation has attracted the flow of 
fictitious capital. It was in this context that AGBAR discovered the value of urban water 
infrastructures as a financial asset and was able to mobilise this embedded value by relinquishing 
majority holdings in ownership-based operation and moving into water based service delivery across 
a diversity of platforms.   
Moreover, this paper has highlighted why new financial actors in the water sector are key players to 
be scrutinized if we are to understand the recent changes in the uneven and variegated geographies 
of the water industry. While financial investors (with no previous experience in the water business) 
are progressively taking stakes in companies in mature markets, management in most of those 
cases, as well as exploration for new water sources (such as desalination), remains in the hands of 
traditional water companies. Future research regarding the way in which financial actors have 
deepened the array of accumulation strategies in the water sector, may want to explore the 
implications of the ageing infrastructure that now is held by pension funds or other financial actors 
that will soon requires massive investment. Will financial institutions and private investors be willing 
to invest further into urban infrastructures or will this presage a return to other forms of public-
based management (as happened in Wales’ move to non-profit based operation)? These questions 
are inseparable from the current form taken by financialisation in the water sector and remain to be 
answered in future research.  
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